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Situation of the Spanish economy and fi nancial sector
Opening remarks by the Governor of the Banco de España, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez, 
at the XV Financial Sector Meeting
I shall be focusing today on the Spanish economy which, naturally enough, has been affected by 
the changes in the international environment prompted by the further slowdown in the US econ-
omy, the rising course of oil prices and the prolongation of the bout of fi nancial turbulence.
To this end, I shall begin with a brief reference to the situation in the United States and in Eu-
rope, focusing thereafter on the macroeconomic outlook for Spain in an attempt to defi ne its 
degree of exposure to the international fi nancial turbulence. Finally, I shall offer some eco-
nomic policy considerations.
It is in the United States that the deterioration in macroeconomic conditions has been most 
marked. The effects of the sharp adjustment in the US real estate sector have been amplifi ed 
by the consequences of the instability in international fi nancial markets, severely affecting busi-
ness and household confi dence. The outlook of most analysts for 2008 points to a strong 
deceleration in the fi rst two quarters of the year, and even to a recession at some point along 
the line, although any more medium-term projection is shrouded in considerable uncertainty. 
In the euro area, some of the risks to continued economic dynamism progressively material-
ised during 2007. These were, namely: the appreciation of the euro; higher oil, commodity and 
food prices; worsening confi dence and tighter fi nancing conditions, prompted by the fi nancial 
strains; and, of course, the effects of the above-mentioned weakening in the US economy. In 
Europe, this made for a slowdown in the pace of activity in the second half of the year, al-
though euro area growth remained more robust than in the United States. The resilience shown 
by the euro area has led analysts to project growth for the coming quarters that will be slacker 
but not far off potential, albeit with a similar measure of uncertainty to that expressed in the 
case of the US economy.
Turning to prices in the euro area, the rate of infl ation stood at 3.5% in March 2008. This wor-
rying fi gure refl ects the strong short-term upward pressures stemming from energy and food 
price rises in recent months. Foreseeably, although infl ation may hold at a rate of over 2% for 
a number of months more, it should begin to move back to this level in the second half of 
2008. That said, considerable upside risks remain, linked essentially to the possibility of sec-
ond-round effects emerging in wage- and price-setting.  
The Spanish economy ended the year 2007 with a GDP growth rate (of around 3.5%) that we 
might qualify as robust. But it began to show signs of undergoing a change in cycle, following 
an upturn that had lasted for more than ten years. Into 2008, the information available confi rms 
this perception of the domestic macroeconomic situation.  
In 2007, GDP growth averaged 3.8%, the result of some easing in domestic demand and an 
improvement in the contribution of net external demand to output growth. Against this back-
ground, the slowing trajectory on which the Spanish economy embarked during 2007 was 
consistent with the tailing off of some of the impulses behind the buoyancy of spending in 
previous years, and with the maturing of the business cycle. Undoubtedly, the raising of inter-
est rates by the ECB - from end-2005 to June 2007 - and the increasingly subdued rises in 
house prices began to temper consumption and residential investment decisions as early as 
2006. This gradual loss of momentum in domestic demand continued in 2007, but was not 
refl ected on a similar scale by GDP, owing to the offsetting effect of net external demand.
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Adding to this domestic adjustment dynamic was, from summer 2007, the effect of interna-
tional fi nancial market instability. This translated into a deterioration in agents’ expectations, 
and made itself felt in some spending components - consumption and, above all, residential 
investment - as early as late 2007, but more clearly in the opening months of this year.
However, the weakening in consumption is based on comparison with the relatively high end-
2007 fi gures, with growth close to 3%, held up by the dynamism of disposable income. And I 
believe it is particularly worth noting that investment in equipment ended the year at a rate of 
increase of close to 9%, highlighting the robustness of business activity in the closing months 
of 2007 against a backdrop of sound corporate earnings and a favourable demand outlook. 
The demand for housing, which had moved onto a mildly slowing path in mid-2006 in re-
sponse to higher borrowing costs and lower real estate appreciation expectations, appears to 
be showing greater sensitivity to the deterioration in agents’ confi dence, according to the lat-
est available information. Recent fi gures reveal a loss of momentum in activity and employ-
ment in the construction and related sectors, as they do more generally, but on a lesser scale, 
in the rest of the economy. In any event, when considering the ongoing adjustment in the 
residential sector, which was largely inevitable following a prolonged phase of growth in supply, 
we should not overlook the considerable forces underpinning the demand for housing in the 
medium term in Spain, which should help temper the scale and intensity of the adjustment.
The performance of trade in goods and services with the rest of the world has been rela-
tively favourable in recent quarters, and has helped net external demand to make a positive 
contribution to GDP growth and, therefore, to alleviate the loss of momentum in domestic 
demand. I would highlight the resilience of exports in the past year, despite the signifi cant 
appreciation of the euro and the somewhat diminished dynamism of export markets. Indeed, 
an incipient change in the direction of our exports towards more buoyant markets is becom-
ing perceptible.
Nevertheless, the nation’s net borrowing continued to increase, albeit at a slacker pace than in 
previous years, reaching 9.5% of GDP in 2007, mainly due to the marked and expected dete-
rioration in the income balance. The tendency towards a gradual easing in investment by fi rms 
and, above all, by households should help move the current account defi cit onto a declining 
course.
The pace of employment generation adapted to the gradual slowing of activity in the second 
half of 2007, ending the year at a growth rate of 2.5%. This trajectory has continued, some-
what more sharply, in the opening months of 2008. It has particularly affected employment in 
the construction industry and also, though to a lesser extent, in manufacturing activities, some 
of which are closely related to the construction branch. In contrast, employment in services is 
proving far more resilient.
Despite this loss of dynamism in the labour market, labour costs began to rise in 2007, when 
compensation per employee grew at a rate of 3.6%, and have continued to do so in early 
2008, with growth in wage settlements to February of 3.5%. It is highly likely, once the effect 
of indexation clauses (for the deviation by infl ation from its offi cial target in 2007) is taken into 
account, that labour costs will rise by more than 4% in 2008 for almost 70% of private-sector 
workers subject to a collective bargaining agreement.
This development is rather unfortunate given the change in cycle facing the Spanish economy, 
as it may ultimately have an adverse effect on fi rms’ hiring decisions, accentuating the employ-
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ment adjustment in a setting of macroeconomic uncertainty. But it is also inappropriate from 
the standpoint of its impact on infl ation, at a time when this variable, as you know, is deteriorat-
ing sharply. In recent months, the growth rate of the consumer price index has exceeded 
4.5%.
Undeniably, the rising course of infl ation, driven by the substantial increases in oil and agricul-
tural commodity prices on international markets, is a phenomenon common to most econo-
mies. But in Spain these pressures are compounding a situation in which upward biases in 
cost and price formation persist, accentuating the risk of the deterioration in infl ation spreading 
to the rest of the economy. 
With a view to the immediate future, the macroeconomic projections recently published by the 
Banco de España suggest national demand will continue to lose steam, in both its consump-
tion and capital investment components. This is expected, however, to be partly offset by the 
improved contribution of the net external balance. In this setting, GDP growth is projected to 
stand at around 2.4% in 2008. As to the infl ation outlook, the private consumption defl ator will 
foreseeably increase to an average rate of 3.6%, albeit on a slowing path during the year. 
On numerous occasions the Banco de España has indicated that the Spanish economy has 
undergone far-reaching changes in recent years. These have increased its growth potential 
and provided it with elements of fl exibility that leave it better placed to face any shocks that 
may arise. Acting along these lines have been Spanish euro area membership, notable popu-
lation dynamism and the investment drive made in recent years, which have equipped the 
Spanish economy with sound foundations to maintain sustained growth in the medium term. 
Undoubtedly, though, the external turbulence that arose during 2007 may detract from the 
effectiveness of this fl exibility.
One possible source of risks is lower growth of the world economy, either because certain 
economies - particularly the United States – may contract more than expected, or because the 
loss of dynamism may spread more intensely to other areas. This would hinder the buffer role 
that external demand should play in the context of slowing domestic demand. Another series 
of potential risks are those that would arise from any prolongation of the fi nancing diffi culties in 
international markets generated by the turmoil. Let me go more deeply into this second area, 
as I believe it is of particular relevance for this Meeting.
Much has been written and said in recent months on the origins and propagation of the turbu-
lence. I shall therefore focus here on the consequences of this episode for the Spanish fi nan-
cial system, a matter on which there has also been no shortage of comment, though not 
perhaps always well-founded.
As you know, Spanish credit institutions have based a substantial portion of their business in 
the recent upturn on the granting of loans for housing development and purchases. And a 
large number of these loans have ultimately been repackaged as negotiable fi nancial instru-
ments by means of securitisation.
These two phenomena are, as you all know, at the root of the problems experienced by certain 
credit institutions in other regions. But before drawing any insuffi ciently founded conclusions 
from this, we must bear in mind the differences between Spanish institutions and those be-
yond our borders that have been more severely impacted by the effects of the turbulence. As 
I shall explain, these differences are substantial and place Spanish fi nancial institutions in a 
sound position to withstand these effects.
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The fi rst and certainly one of the most signifi cant differences lies in the fact that Spanish 
banks have kept the risks of the loans they have securitised on their balance sheets. The 
“originate-to-distribute” model followed elsewhere has not been developed at all in Spain 
and, consequently, credit institutions’ incentives to value loan risks in a cautious and rigorous 
manner have not been weakened. Under these conditions, it is perfectly understandable why 
products like the US subprime mortgages, which triggered the current situation, have not 
emerged.
Secondly, Spanish banks have used securitisation not as a mechanism for transferring risks off 
their balance sheets, but as a means of raising resources on the wholesale fi nancing markets 
in order to meet the demand for loans from households and businesses. That gives rise di-
rectly to a second signifi cant difference in favour of the Spanish fi nancial system, since when 
the main objective is to raise funds and not transfer risks, it is not necessary to resort to the 
issuance of overly complex fi nancial instruments.
Indeed, the securities issued by Spanish banks are characterised by their simplicity, by their 
relatively long maturities (matching, therefore, those of the assets they are fi nancing) and by 
their needing only moderate credit enhancements to attain a high rating. This is clearly in con-
trast with other systems, in which complex structured products and rather ad hoc vehicles 
such as conduits and SIVs have proliferated to channel the fi nancing of low-grade loans.
Likewise, in Spanish bank portfolios the weight of these structured products, which have bur-
geoned in the countries most affected, and of the securities issued by these special fi nancing 
vehicles is negligible. In Spain, the traditional retail banking model has continued to prevail. 
And this prevalence also explains the minimal direct exposure of our fi nancial institutions to 
other factors of risk associated with recent developments in the international fi nancial markets. 
Such is the case, for instance, with leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) and the so-called monolines, 
which specialise, as you know, in insuring the payment of numerous bonds, including those 
linked to the securitisation of US subprime mortgages. 
In these circumstances it is easy to understand why the profi ts reported by Spanish banks in 
2007 have scarcely been affected by the fi nancial turbulence and have continued to increase 
at a rate of around 19%, fi rmly underpinned by their improved effi ciency ratios. Their profi tabil-
ity, both in terms of assets and in relation to capital, also grew compared with 2006. Indeed, 
the ROE stood at almost 20%.
Profi tability is obviously the fi rst line of defence for Spanish banks against any adverse shock. 
But their resilience is also based on two other pillars: a signifi cant volume of provisions, ac-
cumulated by the system during the period of strong credit growth thanks to the prudential 
mechanisms set in place by the Banco de España in the past; and a comfortable solvency 
position. To quantify these two aspects, loan loss provisions widely exceed doubtful assets, 
while the system’s solvency ratio, measured in accordance with the Basel regulatory stand-
ards, is 11.4%, 3.4 percentage points higher than required.
These factors mean that Spanish credit institutions face the current situation from a position of 
soundness which, in the international context, is fairly unique. Soundness however is not a 
synonym for immunity and it would be imprudent, and not befi tting a supervisor, to fail to con-
sider thoroughly the potential risks.
In this respect, I should fi rst like to refer to the recent developments in the doubtful assets ratio 
for loans granted to households for house purchase. For the last few months, this ratio has 
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been on a rising trend. And as it will no doubt continue to grow in the future, I feel we should 
view it as a worrying factor, but only a moderately worrying one, for the following reasons. 
Primarily, because we must not forget that this ratio had been at exceptionally low levels as a 
result of the high rates of growth of lending itself (the denominator of the ratio), so that in-
creases would have been expected even in the absence of the present tensions. Secondly, 
because the current levels are still relatively low and well below those of other markets. How-
ever, in addition, there are some specifi c features of our fi nancial practices that tend to limit the 
scope of this source of risk. I am basically referring to the fact that in Spain, unlike in the 
United States, households tend to default on their mortgage payments only in really extreme 
conditions. 
The causes for concern may be greater in the case of loans for property development. True, 
the coincidence of the maturing of the property cycle and the triggering of international fi nan-
cial tensions has been particularly untimely for the Spanish economy. But, the stress tests we 
have performed at the Banco de España to calibrate the potential scale of this risk for banks 
show, broadly speaking, that the policy followed in recent years of accumulating provisions 
and capital has given rise to a buffer that would enable shocks of an order of magnitude com-
parable to those experienced at the height of the crisis in the 90s to be absorbed.
I now come to what I consider to be the main source of uncertainty at the present moment. 
This is none other than future developments on the international wholesale fi nancing markets, 
where the possibilities of raising funds have been at extraordinarily restricted levels that are not 
in keeping with a developed international fi nancial system.
Spanish banks have so far largely managed to evade the consequences of this sudden fi nan-
cial market squeeze. Firstly, because their liabilities were issued at relatively long maturities, so 
that the need to refi nance the loans granted is arising much more smoothly than in other sys-
tems in which the relative weight of short-term securities is greater.
The low level of dependence on funds raised in the interbank deposit markets has been an-
other mitigating factor. I should point out here that once the subsidiaries and branches of for-
eign banks have been excluded, whose liquidity management is strongly governed by the 
geographical diversifi cation strategies decided by their parents, the rest of the Spanish credit 
system does not borrow in these markets but instead maintains a net credit position in them. 
And I should not fail to mention either that the recent dynamism of Spanish households’ de-
posits and the progressive return of credit to a more sustainable growth rate has also helped 
cushion Spanish banks’ funding requirements.
In these conditions, the Spanish credit system has found alternatives to recourse to the mar-
kets for medium-term fi nancing to cover its funding requirements. More specifi cally, issuance 
of shorter-dated securities, such as commercial paper, has been stepped up and more inten-
sive use has been made of the leeway provided by the Eurosystem’s monetary policy opera-
tional framework to cover liquidity requirements. In relation to the latter, I should like to empha-
sise that this possibility has been available to Spanish banks, as it has to all other banks of the 
area, since the very outset of monetary union, and it therefore comes as no surprise that it is 
used to a greater extent at times like the present. That said, the use currently being made of 
this facility remains moderate, as shown by the fact that the liquidity raised by Spanish banks 
as a proportion of total Eurosystem operations is barely commensurate with the weight of 
Spanish GDP in the euro area, or that this facility accounts, according to end-2007 data, for 
only 1.3% of the total bank balance sheet.
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Clearly, recourse to these alternative facilities is to some extent temporary; it is taking place in 
a situation of heightened uncertainty and it is not reasonable to think that it is going to be 
perpetuated. But it is also clear that if this episode continues much longer, its effects on the 
Spanish economy may be signifi cant, as is to be expected in the case of an economy in which 
external fi nancing is one of the fundamental elements underpinning growth. 
When the ability of the international fi nancial system to perform its role of allocating resources 
effi ciently is seriously curtailed, as at present, the fi nancial soundness of borrowers is not suf-
fi cient to attract the fi nancing they need. Thus, if the strains currently affecting the main whole-
sale markets for medium and long-term fi nancing are prolonged excessively, we cannot ulti-
mately rule out greater constraints on the raising of external fi nancing by the economy.
The poor functioning of these wholesale markets has a global dimension and there is rela-
tively little that the Spanish authorities can do to help mitigate it. However, the Banco de Es-
paña can and will proceed to ensure that Spanish banks continue managing their risks pru-
dently and have appropriate risk provisioning policies that guarantee their fi nancial soundness. 
This is undoubtedly the best way of ensuring that, once uncertainties have been dispelled and 
normal market functioning restored, fi nancial institutions can continue to effi ciently perform 
their role of channelling fi nancial fl ows between our country and the rest of the world. In addi-
tion, the Banco de España will continue encouraging banks and savings banks to start issuing 
medium-term bonds again and to place them on the international markets. The positive expe-
rience of Spanish banks that have already done this during the last fortnight, and the improve-
ment in bank risk recorded in certain markets, make these issues a unique window of oppor-
tunity for the fi nancial system’s use of international euro markets to return to normal. Also, and 
as part of the Eurosystem, the Banco de España will continue to help facilitate the adequate 
provision of liquidity, to ensure the proper functioning of money markets.
But, apart from the functions assigned to the Banco de España in relation to fi nancial stability, 
in our capacity as a central bank and bank supervisor, it is also our duty to contribute our 
opinion, in the performance of our task of overseeing macroeconomic stability, on the design 
of the response that should be framed in a situation such as that described. This response 
must include both the role of the economic policies of the various tiers of government and the 
responsibilities that must be assumed by the various economic and social agents. 
We should all accept that in a situation like the present one in which the economy is facing a 
slowdown, in an adverse international setting and surrounded by risk factors, it is more important 
than ever that economic policies be fi rmly geared in two directions: fi rst, towards safeguarding 
macroeconomic stability; and further, to  promoting the adoption of structural measures and re-
forms in product and factor markets, to enhance the degree of competition in the environment in 
which agents take their decisions, the mobility of factors of production and the fl exibility of price 
and wage-setting mechanisms. I believe that both strategies generate substantial synergies if 
they are pursued simultaneously. And in Spain we have the experience of the key role they have 
played in the real convergence of the Spanish economy over the last decade.
And this is so because it is essential that the response of supply and demand to the changes 
required to rebalance the various sources of spending and the various sectors of activity 
should be fl exible, so as to ensure that the slowdown is mild and leads promptly to a new path 
of high growth, in line with the economy’s potential, that is more balanced and sustainable.
This is the stance that should, in my opinion, inform the actions of central government and 
other government bodies, which in Spain’s highly decentralised system of regional govern-
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ment have very signifi cant responsibilities, as well as the behaviour of economic and social 
agents, whose attitude may determine the degree of fl exibility of the productive system and of 
the institutional framework and the viability of the necessary reforms.
We should be aware that there is very little room for expansionary demand policies here and 
that inappropriate use of such policies may even be counter-productive. Monetary policy 
ceased to be an autonomous economic policy tool a decade ago. Its primary objective is to 
maintain price stability in the euro area over the medium term. From the point of view of do-
mestic requirements, the monetary and fi nancial conditions in which Spanish households and 
businesses have been operating have been becoming progressively tighter and are currently 
more in line with the need to stem infl ationary pressures in the Spanish economy.
For its part, the fi scal position is in a favourable starting position since public fi nances were 
again in surplus in 2007 (2.2% of GDP) and the debt ratio stood at 36.2% of GDP, levels un-
precedented in the recent history of the Spanish economy. These results refl ect the strong 
commitment of previous governments to fi scal discipline, but also substantial growth of the 
Spanish economy in recent years and the buoyancy of the property market. That has resulted 
in strong growth in tax revenues, exceeding that seen in previous upturns. Accordingly, the 
fi scal projections that are consistent with the macroeconomic scenario I have set out today 
point to the fi scal surplus almost disappearing in 2009. 
With this in mind, when designing the appropriate fi scal policy strategy for the downturn in the 
Spanish economy, it makes complete sense to give free rein to the automatic stabilisers, 
whose movement tends to counter cyclical fl uctuations. This is one of the great advantages 
arising from the fi scal consolidation drive that took place during the expansion. The automatic 
nature of these instruments makes them the most suitable ones for stabilisation, because they 
respond rapidly to changes in the cycle, they help agents to form correct expectations regard-
ing the authorities’ actions and they boost confi dence. However, discretionary increases in 
public spending and tax reductions beyond the specifi c scope of the automatic stabilisers 
should be avoided, since they may compromise the maintenance of medium and long-term 
budgetary stability and eliminate the fi scal policy leeway to respond to sharper slowdowns. 
Maintaining a stance of budgetary stability during the downturn is, in any case, compatible 
with measures that may alter the composition of revenues and spending, without giving rise to 
a permanent deterioration in the budgetary situation, especially if such measures contribute to 
enhancing the quality of public fi nances and the effi ciency of the economy. But, for this to be 
possible, it is essential to strive to contain expenditure, by means of countermeasures in those 
areas that offer the most scope for cost reductions, at all levels of general government.
It would seem, then, that the promotion of structural measures and reforms, geared towards 
improving the functioning of markets, making wage and price-setting mechanisms more fl ex-
ible and facilitating the reallocation of factors of production across sectors, is the main instru-
ment available to economic policymakers and economic and social agents to enable each, in 
their respective areas of responsibility, to contribute to easing the downturn and promoting 
prompt recovery.
All matters relating to the functioning of the labour market, good industrial relations, collective 
bargaining and outstanding reforms take on great importance in the current situation. This is 
because the dynamism of the Spanish population as a supportive factor for limiting the inten-
sity and scope of the slowdown largely depends on labour market fl exibility. This is especially 
so at the current juncture, with rising wages and a deteriorating infl ationary situation. Hence, 
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the search for formulas permitting a resumption of a trajectory of wage moderation has be-
come a priority, such moderation – with the support of social agents – having yielded such 
good results in terms of employment generation in the recent past. Among other measures, I 
have in mind changes to the current wage indexation arrangements, which tend to prolong the 
impact of infl ation surges. Changes are also needed in the collective bargaining framework 
and in labour hiring, in order to facilitate the adjustment of wages to the new cyclical situation 
and to smooth the adjustment in employment.
Obviously, however, these measures need to be complemented by resolute reforms to the 
competitive environment in which fi rms and agents take their decisions through liberalisation 
and deregulation policies that help reduce the constant growth in profi t margins in less com-
petitive sectors and to boost effi ciency and productivity. From the viewpoint of the long-term 
needs of the Spanish economy, all this should be accompanied by improvements in education 
and in training in order to adapt workers’ skills to the new requirements and to boost their in-
ter-sectoral mobility.
Allow me one fi nal refl ection not so much on what should be done as on what should not. It is 
true that the global slowdown is leading many governments to embark on different forms of 
protectionism, responding to the calls of those economic agents who are demanding help 
against foreign competitors. It is a mistake to succumb to such calls. Spain should not follow 
this bad example, since any measures in favour of specifi c agents solely on the basis of their 
nationality would ultimately harm other Spanish companies and all Spanish citizens. On the 
contrary, we should continue to adhere to increasing openness to competition and to the for-
eign investment that has contributed so much to our well-being in recent decades, focusing 
our efforts on promoting a climate conducive to business activity and on removing all obsta-
cles and rigidities that hamper enterprise.
To conclude, I wish to affi rm my confi dence that the Spanish economy has suffi cient factors of 
resilience to successfully face the inevitable slowdown, even in an unfavourable external envi-
ronment. Such resilience has been built up through the efforts of everyone (State, central 
government and other government bodies, and social agents), and has demonstrated the 
benefi ts of policies geared towards stability and long-term growth, particularly when the econ-
omy faces signifi cant challenges such as those at present.
Thank you very much.
15.4.2008.
